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Abstract
This paper develops a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model of en-
dogenous growth with illicit drugs and guns trade. With a trade framework that
unies both drug-control policies in consuming- and producing-country, as well as
explicit modeling of rearm trade, the model is solved and parameterized to study
the dynamic trade-o¤ and growth e¤ects of various drug-control policies. A pro-
duction-consumption growth trade-o¤ not previously documented in the literature
is found. Further, under di¤erent conditions, and depending on the resulting gain
in formal trade expansion, there are economic rationale to either a prohibitive or
liberalization drug-control policy.
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1 Introduction
Drug trade-related criminal gangs and crime has escalated across Central America and
the Caribbean over the past two decades.1 The regions location between the United
States (U.S.), which is the principal consumer nation, and the illicit-crop farming Andean
nations, combined with increased drug production and interdiction in the Caribbean,
has made Central America a key illicit drug hub. Indeed, as documented in the various
editions of the World Drug Report (for instance, UNODC 2014-18), about 90% of the
cocaine consumed in the U.S. crosses the land border between Mexico and the United
States, with the large majority of that ow crossing through or along the Pacic and
Atlantic coasts of Central America.
The links between drugs, guns, and crime are the subject of a substantial literature,
most of which focuses on the U.S. and Central America [see, for instance, Miron (2001),
Demombynes (2011)]. If the illicit drug trade brings more criminal gangs and guns or
heavier weapons into an area, their easy availability could facilitate crime, both related and
not related to the drugs trade. Research in the U.S. has suggested that crime was prevalent
around the period of the crack epidemic in the U.S. because the trade fueled demand for
guns, leading to di¤usion of guns in the illicit market (Blumstein 1995; Blumstein et al.
2000). In its report, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (2016)
highlighted this linkage: the relationship between homicide, rearm, and drug commerce
is central. Drugs nance the purchase of rearms, which in turn are used as indirect
factors of drugs production and tra¢ cking.
In addition, since Richard Nixon formally declared a war on drugs in 1971, di¤er-
ent policies have been implemented in both consumer and producer countries with the
1For instance, Langton (2011) documented the rise of the Mexican drug cartels and implies their
dominant role in the illicit drugs and rearms trade in the region. Similarly, the role of Central
America-based organized drug syndicates in the illicit markets are also documented in Bagley (2012)
and Bagley and Rosen (2015). More recently, the controversial issue with regards to the rise of drug
syndicates, MS-13 and M-8, in the United States can be found in several press reports. For example, see
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39645640.
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goal of reducing illegal drugsconsumption (Whitford and Yates 2009). Several anti-drug
strategies, ranging from the eradication of illicit crops, the detection and destruction of
processing labs, the interdiction of drug shipments en-route to consumer markets, and
outright legalization against drug possession have been implemented. However, mixed
results are observed. In LSE (2014), it is argued that drug free worldideology that un-
derpins these strategies have been counter-productive, therefore requiring a fundamental
restructuring of drug-control policies to combat the highly-persistent illicit drugs trade.
Furthermore, a number of researchers have argued that under certain conditions, ag-
gressive drug enforcement may potentially amplify crime. For instance, Becker et al.
(2006) note that if the demand for drugs is inelastic, increased enforcement will increase
the price and reduce consumption, but will also increase the total resources available to
drug syndicates. Likewise, in Ortiz (2003, 2009), drug policy ine¤ectiveness is due to drug
producers responding by improving productivity to compensate for the increased repres-
sion. Under these conditions, facing robust revenue, drug syndicates are better equipped
to further purchase weapons to aid their illicit trades. Evidence for this hypothesis comes
from a long-term look at the evolution of crime rate in the U.S.: Dills et al. (2010) show
that increases in enforcement of drug prohibition in the U.S. over the past 100 years have
been associated with increases in crime rate.
Against this backdrop, there is also an active debate amongst policymakers and re-
searchers alike about greater liberalization of drug policy. As an example, Portugal un-
dertook a monumental experiment: it decriminalized the use of all drugs in 2001, even
heroin and cocaine, and unleashed a major public health campaign to tackle addiction.
Ever since in Portugal, drug addiction has been treated more as a medical challenge than
as a criminal justice issue. The results from this experiment suggest a stark dichotomy
with the tough stance of the U.S., with some argued that it works better. Perhaps, propo-
nents of such arguments have lead to the increasing number of American states legalizing
the possession of non-medical cannabis in recent years, despite laws at the Federal level
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remaining largely prohibitive.2
This dichotomy in drug management approach underline the general di¢ culties in
assessing the economic impact and trade-o¤ associated with various drug-control policies,
more so if one were to understand the intricate nexus and externalities between the illicit
trades and the formal tradable sectors. To date, the existing theoretical literature on
macroeconomics of drugs have focused mainly on modelling the vertical supply-chain
of drugs, and therefore su¤ers from three shortcomings, namely: (i) limited number of
dynamic general equilibrium models that allow for the examination of growth e¤ects and
potential policy trade-o¤ for the di¤erent stages of drug-control intervention ; (ii) the
modelling of consumersoptimizing choice of drug consumption and addiction, as well as
those of drugstranshipment and production, tend to be completely separate; (iii) the
non-adoption of a trade framework, as well as the absence of explicitly modeling of illicit
rearm trades, means the various spillover and externalities between the illicit trades and
productive formal trades cannot be studied.
To address these, we adopt a horizontal perspective to model the illicit drugs and guns
trade by developing a unied endogenous growth framework with international trade
and drugs control that also accounts for consumers rational addiction and optimizing
choice of drug consumption. Specically, a two-country, multi-sectorial dynamic general
equilibrium model of endogenous growth with drugs and guns trade is developed, solved
both analytically and computationally, with the parameterized version, an illustrative
sourceeconomy based on ve regional developing economies (El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Jamaica, and Mexico) that are controversially known as nestof illicit drugs
and guns trade to/from the U.S.) used to simulate various drug-control policy experiments.
To preview our results, while prohibitive drug-control policy (both at the end-consumer
and supply side) is trade- and growth-enhancing to the formal sector, we uncover a pro-
2Colorado and Washington became the rst states to legalize possession of non-medical cannabis.
These are subsequently followed by several states in the U.S.
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duction-consumption growth trade-o¤ that has not been previously documented in the
literature, in that, if private consumption growth-maximization is prioritized in the con-
suming country over output growth, there is rationale for drug liberalization. Indeed, the
policy e¤ect is nonlinear in that, the more open the consuming country is (a larger share of
imported tradables in nal consumption), the wider the range of initial rational-addiction
condition that would allow drug liberalization policy to be output growth-enhancing (in-
stead of growth-deteriorating). In addition, in the absence of any fundamental change
to world drug demand and supply, our policy experiments nd neither a more intensied
intermediary-interdiction policy (at drug transhipment) nor any non-quota gun-control
policy (such as a tax levied on production), is e¤ective in reducing the illicit trades for
drugs and guns. A more direct supply-side policy aimed at eradicating drug cultivation ap-
pears to be more e¤ective in raising formal trades and growth, though the e¤ectiveness as
well as whether households in the source country that partly involve in drugs trade, albeit
implicitly, can be compensated via the resulting (formal) international-trade expansion
e¤ect depend a lot on the openness of the source country. We believe some of these
ndings provide partial explanation on the mixed outcome observed from the global war
on drugs over the past few decades.
The rest of the paper are structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
model. Section 3 denes the dynamic and balanced growth equilibrium, and then proceeds
to solve the model. In Section 4, the parameterization strategy is dicussed. After that,
various illustrative drug-control policy experiments are presented in Section 5, with the
sub-sections being structured according to di¤erent policy theme and questions. Section
6 concludes the paper.
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2 The Model
We examine the controversial drugs-guns trade using a theoretical framework of a two-
country dynamic general equilibrium model with international trade. Country A is a
relatively developedeconomy populated by a representative household who consumes
ordinary tradable goods (domestically produced and traded from Country B) and drugs
the latter modelled as a rationally addicted good that is not produced in Country A. Firms
in Country A produces ordinary tradable goods using labor and physical capital supplied
by households. There is also a price-taking rm producing guns, using a proprietary
technology and inputs of domestically produced ordinary tradables.3 Due to legal restric-
tion, the guns produced are not sold to the household, but exported to Country B and
purchased by the Government in Country A. The Government taxes labor and capital
income, as well as the sales of guns. While the Government discourages consumption of
drugs by conscating them at a random probability in each period, consumption of drugs
is not deemed as criminal o¤ense.
Country B is a developing economy populated by identical individuals and a drug syn-
dicate. Individuals do not hold physical capital, consume ordinary tradables (domestically
produced and traded from Country A), and do not consume drugs. Instead, they supply
labor hours to both a representative rm in the formal sector producing ordinary trad-
ables, as well as a drug syndicate who produces drugs. Production activities in Country
B are human capital-driven, with the individuals having a choice to invest in formal/legal
human capital each period, a feature similar to Mocan et al. (2005). The drug syndicate
is modelled as a stylized agent similar in fashion to Blackburn et al. (2017) and related
studies4, who maximizes its expected payo¤ by producing drugs using guns (traded from
3Alternatively, one can argue that the production of guns requires the use of physical capital. Given
that the ordinary tradables produced in Country A have already used both labor and physical capital as
inputs, specifying guns as being a transformation of ordinary tradables would have the same interpreta-
tion. Instead, productivity of guns-production benets from an Arrow-Romer type of knowledge spillover
embedded in the physical capital stock in Country A.
4In practice, organized drug syndicates tend to have much more sophisticated structure, as documented
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Country A) and e¤ective labor hours, where productivity depends on the average level
of drug-specic human capital (interpretable as some sort of cultural capital that ben-
ets specically drugs production) that in equilibrium, equals the accumulated stock of
drugs addiction in Country A. Our specication for Country B essentially mergesthe
production chains of illicit-crop farming and drug tra¢ cking into a single drug syndicate,
as compared to the vertically-integrated model of Mejía and Restrepo (2016). Neverthe-
less, given that most mechanisms (in the di¤erent vertical production chains) in their
model operate through resource (re-)allocation, the di¤erences in terms of transmission
mechanisms of our simplied specication for Country B are largely immaterial in a
long-run context. Instead, we trade some of the vertical features o¤ for a greater hor-
izontal perspective on the illlicit drugs and guns trades, by developing a two-country,
multi-sectorial dynamic general equilibrium framework that is solvable for a balanced
growth equilibrium, hence allowing for the examination of dynamic tradeo¤ and long-run
growth implications of drug-control policies.
2.1 Country A
Country A Household: The representative household in Country A faces a risk neutral
expected lifetime utility, which depends on the chosen sequences of consumption of ordi-
nary tradable goods (a bundle of tradable home good and imported good), Ct+s, labor,
Lt+s, and the consumption of drugs, t+s, for s = 0; 1; :::;1, as in
Ut = Et
1X
s=0
s
 
(CAt+s)
1 & 1CA
1  & 1CA
  L
1 +  
L1+ t+s + 
[t+s(t+s)
 ]1 &
 1

1  & 1
!
; (1)
where CAt is consumption, &CA > 0 intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
Lt =
R 1
0
Litdi, the share of total time endowment (normalized to unity) spent working, with
Lit denoting the number of hours of labor provided to the i rms,  2 (0; 1) the subjective
in contributions such as Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) and similar case studies. In a two-country, multi-
sectorial general equilibrium framework, some of these features are abbreviated.
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discount factor, t is the period t stock of accumulated past drugs consumption taken as
given by household, Et the expectation operator conditional on the information available
at the beginning of period t. Instantaneous utility is therefore additively separable in
terms of the consumption of ordinary tradable goods and drugs.5
In each period t, the representative household faces a constant probability, , where
the possession of drugs evades conscation, and probability, 1   , where the drugs are
conscated by the government. For simplicity, if the drugs are conscated, drug possession
is assumed to be not a criminal o¤ense and the household merely gets zero utility from
t and does not go to jail.
6
In line with the tradition of Becker and Murphy (1988), we assume addiction is both
time-consistent and rational, and the utility generated from drugs consumption depends
on both current and past accumulated consumption.7 Specically, the stock of past con-
sumption, t, is specied to evolve according to
t+1 = (1  )t + t; (2)
or equivalently,
t+1
t
= (1  ) + t
t
; (3)
where  2 [0; 1] measures the degree of persistence of the addiction from accumulated
past consumption of drugs. If  = 0, past addiction does not diminimish over time, while
 = 1 means drugs consumptions in the past do not inuence the accumulation/addiction
5In spite of the additive separable functional form, current-period drug consumption (t) is quasi-
complementary to past accumulated consumption (t), a key feature that is consistent with the rational
addiction literature in the tradition of Becker and Murphy (1988), with relatively more sophisticated
utility specication of rational addiction further discussed in Gruber and Köszegi (2001). The specication
of the constant probability, , is also in consistent with most macroeconomic models of crime, such as
Imrohoro¼glu et al. (2004, 2006).
6While debatable, the simplication in assuming drug as not a imprisonable o¤ense is in line with
empirical evidence such as Kuziemko and Levitt (2004), which documented that the overall impact of
increased drug incarceration has been very small in reducing the criminal incidence.
7In microeconomic studies focusing on cigarettesaddiction, such as ODonoghue and Rabin (1999)
and Gruber and Koszegi (2001), agents with time-inconsistent optimization problem are considered. They
also consider the self-control problem of a sophisticated agent, whose consumption decision is modelled as
a subgame-perfect equilibrium in a dynamic game played by the successive intertemporal selves. These
are not considered here.
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process.
In addition to supply labor (in e¤ective terms, AT;At L
T;A
t ) services, household also
owns physical capital and therefore earns income by supplying physical capital and labor
services at each period t, taxed at a constant rate of K and L respectively. Similar
to studies with tradable goods framework, such as Agénor (2016), consumption decisions
on ordinary tradable goods follow a two-step process: rst, the optimal path of total
consumption over time is determined, the amount from which is then allocated between
spending on domestic and foreign tradables. The representative household maximizes (1)
by choosing the optimal sequences of ordinary tradable consumption, CAt , labor, Lt, drugs
consumption, t, and the physical capital stock to hold in the next period, Kt+1, subject
to the end-of-period budget constraint of
(1  L)wT;At AT;At LT;At + (1  K)rT;At Kt = P Tt (CAt + It) + P t t; (4)
where
Kt+1 = (1  K)Kt + It; (5)
taking wages (wT;At ), labor productivity (A
T;A
t ), real interest rate (r
T;A
t ), the tax rates,
price of tradable goods (P Tt ), and price of drugs (P

t ) as given.
In Appendix A, we solve for the rst-order conditions and derive the followings:
EtCAt+1
CAt
=

1

EtP Tt+1
P Tt
[(1  K)EtrT;At+1 + (1  K)]
 &CA
; (6)
Ett+1
t
=
(
1


Ett+1
t
 &
(& 1) EtP t+1
P t
[(1  K)EtrT;At+1 + (1  K)]
) &
; (7)
LL
 
t =
(CAt )
 & 1CA
P Tt
(1  L)wT;At AT;At : (8)
P t = (t)
(1 & 1 ) &
 1

t (1  L)
wT;At A
T;A
t
LL
 
t
: (9)
Equation (6) is the Euler equation associated with ordinary consumption; equation (7)
is the corresponding version for drug consumption (which depends on the growth of the
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total stock of past consumption, t+1=t, given by (3); equation (8) describes the marginal
rate of substitution between labor supply and ordinary tradable consumption; (9) is the
optimality condition for the marginal rate of substitution between drugs consumption and
labor supply.
Combining (8) and (9), the ordinary-drugs consumption ratio of the representative
household is given by
CAt
t
=  &CA(t)
&CA
&
[(1 &)+1](
t
t
)
&CA
& (
P t
P Tt
)&CA ; (10)
which depends on the accumulated stock of past drugs consumption, the evasion proba-
bility, as well as the relative market price ratio of the two goods.
Nominal consumption spending on non-addictive, ordinary tradable goods is P Tt (C
A;A
t +
CA;Bt ), where C
A;A
t is consumption of ordinary tradables home good andC
A;B
t the imported
tradables from Country B. Total consumption is therefore a bundle,
CAt = (C
A;A
t )
(CA;Bt )
1 ; (11)
where  2 (0; 1). The second stage of the optimization problem for the representative
household is therefore to maximize (11) subject to a static budget constraint of Ct =
P Tt C
A;A
t +P
T
t C
A;B
t , which yields an optimal consumption allocation between Country As
(CA;At ) and Country Bs tradables (C
A;B
t ) for the household in Country A:
CA;Bt
CA;At
=
1  

: (12)
Country A Production: The tradable goods are produced by a continuum of iden-
tical perfectly competitive rms i 2 (0; 1), using e¤ective labor, AT;At Li;T;At (where AT;At is
labor productivity), and private physical capital, Ki;At . The production function of rm i
is given by
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Y i;T;At = Q
i;T;A
t (A
T;A
t L
i;T;A
t )
(Ki;At )
1 ; (13)
where the productivity of rms i, Qi;T;At , evolves according to the sectorial-wide physical
capital intensity. Specically, productivity of rm i is subject to a sector-wide Arrow-
Romer type of externality from the total stock of physical capital, congested by the total
employment in the sector (in raw terms), as in
Qi;T;At = Q
T;A
0 [
KAt
LT;At
]$T ; (14)
where KAt =
Z 1
0
Ki;At di, $T > 0.
The prot maximization problem for each rm i involves maximizing
i;T;At = P
T
t Y
i;T;A
t   wT;At (AT;At Li;T;At )  rT;At Ki;At ;
with respect to the private inputs, taking production function, productivity, and input
prices as given. This yields:
AT;At w
T;A
t =
P Tt Y
i;T;A
t
Li;T;At
; rT;At = (1  )
P Tt Y
i;T;A
t
Ki;At
: (15)
In a symmetric equilibrium, given that all rms are identical, we have QT;At = Q
i;T;A
t ,
KAt = K
i;A
t , and Y
T;A
t = Y
i;T;A
t 8i, which yields the aggregate tradable output produced
in Country A:
Y T;At =
Z 1
0
Y i;T;At di = Q
T;A
t (A
T;A
t L
T;A
t )
(KAt )
1 ; (16)
or equivalently, after substituting in (14),
Y T;At = Q
T;A
0 (A
T;A
t )
(LT;At )
 $T (KAt )
1 +$T : (17)
Further, the labor productivity level, AT;At , is specied as inuenced by drugs con-
sumption, as in
AT;At = A
A
0 (
t
t
)A ; (18)
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where AA0 > 0, and A 2 R measures the strength of the drugs e¤ects on labor pro-
ductivity. A positive elasticity indicates positive e¤ect from present-accumulated drug
consumption on labor productivity (a sort of stimulant e¤ect), while a negative elas-
ticity indicates an adverse e¤ect of drugs consumption (as a share of past accumulated
consumption) on labor productivity.
Substituting (18) into (17), we can write
Y T;At = Q
T;A
0 (A
A
0 )

(
t
t
)A(LT;At )
 $T (KAt )
1 +$T : (19)
Likewise, using the two rst-order conditions in (15), we derive a ratio of the factor
prices in Country A as
wT;At
rT;At
=

1  
KAt
LT;At
1
AT;At
;
or equivalently, by substituting in (18),
wT;At
rT;At
=

1  
KAt
LT;At
(AA0 )
 1(
t
t
) A : (20)
Assumption:  = $T . To derive endogenous growth, we restrict our analysis by
imposing the assumption, which then allows us to write (19) as a ratio of the ordinary
tradables to physical capital in Country A:
Y T;At
KAt
= QT;A0 (A
A
0 )

(
t
t
)A: (21)
Guns production: Due to legal restriction, guns are produced by a single rm in
Country A. The production of guns is taxed by the government at a constant rate of G.
Guns are not sold to households. Instead, guns are exported to Country B and sold to the
Government for Country A. The price of guns, PGt , is set by the world market (given the
two-country context, this means the demand of buyers from Country B), with the purchase
of the Goverment for Country A following the same world price.8 The guns-producing
8With this specication, we essentially treats all illicit component of world gun trades as the exported
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rm has a proprietary production technology of
Y G;At = A
G
t (Y
T;AG
t )
{; (22)
where {  0, Y T;AGt is the quantity of ordinary tradables used in gunsproduction, and AGt
is a productivity parameter given by AGt = A
G
0 (K
A
t )
!, where similar to ordinary tradable
production, the productivity of the rm benets from knowledge spillover embedded in
the aggregate physical capital stock of the economy, at a rate ! > 0.
Given the tax rate and the perfectly competitive market for physical capital, the prot
maximization problem for the guns-producing rm is simply given by the unconstrained
maximization problem of:
max
Y T;AGt
(1  G)PGt Y G;At   P Tt Y T;AGt ;
with Y G;At given by (22), which yields the rst-order condition for the demand of ordinary
tradables in gun-production
Y T;AGt =

(1  G)PGt AG0 {
P Tt
 1
1 {
(KAt )
!
1 { : (23)
Assumption: ! = 1  {. Again, to get endogenous growth, we restrict our analysis
by imposing the assumption to rewrite (23) in the AK-form of
Y T;AGt
KAt
=

(1  G)AG0 {
 1
1 {

PGt
P Tt
 1
1 {
: (24)
Government of Country A: The government in Country A does not borrow and
maintains a balanced budget in each period t. The government collects taxed income
from the labor and physical capital, as well as from total guns production (PGt Y
G;A
t ). The
government spends on consumption of domestically produced ordinary tradables (GAt ),
share, while the purchase made by the government in Country A is interpreted as all other legal purchases.
As such, given that the government has imperfect information on the international buyer of guns, it is
reasonable to levy any tax rate of guns at the production stage, and not sales stage.
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guns produced in Country A (GGt ). In addition, the government has a probability 1   
in detecting and conscating drugs from the household, which has a realizable value and
gives an additional rebatereceived in each period, Rt. For simplicity, we assume that
the rebate is a fraction, z 2 (0; 1) of the conscated drugs:
Rt = z(1  )P t t: (25)
The budget constraint of the government is therefore given by
Lw
T;A
t A
T;A
t L
T;A
t + Kr
T;A
t Kt + GP
G
t Y
G;A
t +Rt = P
T
t G
A
t + P
G
t G
G
t : (26)
Without losing generality, government consumption of the ordinary tradables is as-
sumed to be a xed fraction of the domestic householdsconsumption,
GAt = C
A;A
t ;  2 (0; 1): (27)
2.2 Country B
Country B Individuals: In Country B, there is a unit mass of identical individuals
j 2 (0; 1). Each individual j is endowned with one unit of time in each period t, and
for simplicity, individuals do not value leisure in Country B and time is fully allocated
to between working in the tradable sector and working for the drug syndicate, in that
LT;Bj;t + L
;B
j;t = L
B
j;t, where L
B
j;t = 1. Nevertheless, individuals do face some degree of
disutility from working, interpretable as due to poor working conditions. Individuals in
Country B consume ordinary tradables and are assumed to not consume drugs. Wage
income is paid to e¤ective labor in both sectors in that it is inuenced by the level of
human capital/productivity, though individuals can only invest in formal human capital.
In other words, investment in the level of formal human capital that is useful in ordinary
tradable production, HT;Bj;t , is a choice variable. Each individual j therefore chooses a
sequence of investment, IT;Bj;t+s (in tradable price), total consumption, C
B
j;t+s, the labor
hours supplied to both ordinary tradable sector (LT;Bj;t+s) and the drug syndicate (L
;B
j;t+s),
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for s = 0; 1; :::;1, to maximize expected utility,
maxV jt = Et
1X
s=0
s
"
(CBj;t+s)
1 & 1CB
1  & 1CB
  B
1 +  B
(LT;Bj;t + L
;B
j;t )
1+ B
#
; (28)
where  2 (0; 1) the common subjective discount factor, &CB > 0 intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption, and B > 0, subject to an end-of-period ow budget
constraint of
wT;Bt H
T;B
j;t L
T;B
j;t + w
;B
t H
;B
j;t L
;B
j;t + jJ
T;B
t = P
T
t (C
B
j;t + I
T;B
j;t ), (29)
and the time constraint LT;Bj;t + L
;B
j;t = L
B
j;t, taking the prots received from owning the
representative rm, JTBt [j 2 (0; 1) being the fraction of the prots claimed by individual
j] , the respective real wage for employment in the ordinary tradable and drugs production
sector, wT;Bt and w
;B
t , the average drug-specic productivity level, H
;B
j;t , and the tradable
price, P Tt , as given.
The human capital of individual j evolves according to
HT;Bj;t+1 = HBI
T;B
j;t + (1  HB)HT;Bj;t ; (30)
where HB > 0 is the e¢ ciency of human capital investment and 
HB  0 is the depreci-
ation rate of human capital.
Solving an individual js optimization problem yields the rst-order conditions:
 
EtCBj;t+1
CBj;t
!& 1CB
= 
"
HBw
T;B
t+1H
T;B
j;t+1
P Tt+1
+ (1  HB)
#
; (31)
LT;Bj;t + L
;B
j;t =
"
(CBj;t)
 & 1CB
P Tt B
wT;Bt H
T;B
j;t
#1= B
; (32)
HT;Bj;t w
T;B
t = H
;B
t w
;B
t : (33)
Consumption decisions follow a two-step process too. Let CB;Bj;t is consumption of
ordinary tradables home good and CB;Aj;t the imported tradables from Country A. Total
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consumption of each individual j in Country B is therefore a bundle,
CBj;t = (C
B;B
j;t )
%(CB;Aj;t )
1 %; (34)
where % 2 (0; 1). The second stage of the optimization problem for each individual j
is therefore to maximize (34) subject to a static budget constraint of CBt = P
T
t C
B;B
t +
P Tt C
B;A
t , which yields an optimal consumption allocation of:
CB;At
CB;Bt
=
1  %
%
: (35)
For simplicity, we assume that, similar to consumption allocation, in each period t,
individuals in Country B further solves a static labor allocation problem, where each
individual j maximizes LBj;t = (L
T;B
j;t )
#(L;Bj;t )
1 #, subject to the time constraint, LT;Bj;t +
L;Bj;t = L
B
j;t = 1. This gives an optimal allocation of:
L;Bj;t
LT;Bj;t
=
1  #
#
: (36)
Country B production: The tradable goods are produced by a price-taking repre-
sentative rm using only labor. The production technology is constant returns-to-scale
and given by
Y T;Bt = Q
T;B
t (H
T;B
t L
T;B
t )
; (37)
where HT;Bt and L
T;B
t are the average human capital level and total labor hours employed
in the tradable sector.
Productivity of the ordinary tradables-producing rm in Country B, QT;Bt , is assumed
to depend linearly on a scale factor from its trading partner, proxied by the ordinary trad-
able output-to-physical capital ratio of Country A, as well as an Arrow-Romer spillover
e¤ect from the (aggregate) stock of formal human capital in Country B, at a magnitude
1  0. Specically,
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QT;Bt = Q
B
0 (H
T;B
t )
1
Y T;At
KAt
: (38)
As would become clear in the policy experiments section later, this specication means
growth in Country Bs tradable production can only be driven by growth in HT;Bt [in-
directly, policy parameters in (30)] in the steady state, as any other change in policy
arrangements will be growth-neutral and only bring about level e¤ect on tradable pro-
duction in Country B. The deliberate choice is to capture some of the well-documented
persistency in the mediocre growth rates observed in many of the source country for drugs
cultivation [see, for instance, LSE (2014) and Buxton (2015)].
Solving the rms prot maximization problem, max
LT;Bt
T;Bt = P
T
t Y
T;B
t  wT;Bt HT;Bt LT;Bt ,
yields the rst-order condition of
P Tt Y
T;B
t
LT;Bt
= wT;Bt H
T;B
t : (39)
Given that individuals are identical, we know that the average and individual-specic
productivity level in the economy is the same, HT;Bt = H
T;B
j;t .
Assumption: 1 + = 1. To eventually generate endogenous growth for the ordinary
tradable output in Country B, we impose the assumption and rewrite (37) as
Y T;Bt
HT;Bt
= QB0
Y T;At
KAt
(LT;Bt )
: (40)
Drug Syndicate: Similar to Blackburn et al. (2017) and other similar studies in
the literature of organized crime, such as Alexeev et al. (2004) and Kugler et al. (2005),
the drugs sector is modelled as an independent entity from the households in Country B.
In other words, the crime syndicate is modelled as a rational decision maker whose sole
objective is to maximise its expected payo¤ from producing drugs, E(vt ). For simplicity,
we assume the crime syndidate does not consume ordinary tradables.
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The drugsproduction technology is given by
t = A
R
0 (H
;B
t L
;B
t )
'(GFt )
1 '; (41)
where ' 2 (0; 1), and AR0 > 0 is a time-invariant constant productivity level of the drugs-
producer. H;Bt L
;B
t is the e¤ective labor hours used in producing drugs, with a one-to-
one relationship assumed between drug-specic human capital (which is akin to a type
of cultural capital that is common across all workers working in drugs production) and
the total accumulated world drugs consumption, in that, H;Bt = t8t. Drugsproduction
also uses GFt amount of guns purchased from Country A. There is aggregate uncertainty
in producing drugs in that, there is a probability q where new drugs are produced and
a probability 1   q where there is zero production in each period t, despite the costs
incurred. Specically, the expected payo¤ of the drugs syndicate is given by:
E(vt ) =

qP t t   w;Bt H;Bt L;Bt   PGt GFt
 w;Bt L;Bt   PGt GFt
if q
if 1  q ; (42)
Combining (41) and (42), the problem of the drug syndicate is
max
GFt ;L
;B
t
qP t A
R
0 (H
;B
t L
;B
t )
'(GFt )
1 '   w;Bt H;Bt L;Bt   PGt GFt ;
by choosing raw labor hours, L;Bt (it has no control over the economy-wide drug-specic
human capital, which is akin to a type of cultural capital), and number of guns, GFt ,
yielding rst-order conditions of:
'qP t t = w
;B
t H
;B
t L
;B
t ; (43)
qP t (1  ')t = PGt GFt (44)
Given that H;Bt = t8t, equating (43) and (44), we have:
'
(1  ') =
w;Bt H
;B
t L
;B
t
PGt G
F
t
: (45)
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Drug distribution: The distribution of drugs produced in Country B to households
in Country A are assumed to be costly. Specically, adopting a specication that is
commonly used in models with costly distribution (Burstein et al. 2003; Agénor 2016),
distributing/smuggling a unit of drug requires using t units of Country B-produced ordi-
nary tradables traded to Country A (CDistt = tC
A;B
t ). The existence of the distribution
cost means that, in terms of the respective market price, there is a wedge between the
market price of drugs and ordinary tradables, as in:
P t = (1 + t)P
T
t , (46)
where t = 0(
t
t
) . This means the larger the quantity of current drugs production is,
the lower the spread between drug price and ordinary tradable good. The larger the past
accumulated drugs consumed (in other words, the more established world drugs trade is),
the higher the price mark-up of drugs.
Rewriting (46), we can express the price ratio of drugs and tradables as:
P t
P Tt
= [1 + 0(
t
t
) ]: (47)
2.3 Market-clearing conditions
In Country A, the equilibrium conditions of the factor markets for physical capital and
labor are given by Kt = KAt , and Lt = L
T;A
t . For the ordinary tradable goods produced
in Country A, equating supply to demand, which consists of private consumption by
households in Country A, investment, government consumption, inputs used in guns-
production, and those traded to Country B (CB;At ), we have
Y T;At = C
A;A
t + It +G
A
t + Y
T;AG
t + C
B;A
t : (48)
For Country B, we rst impose the symmetric equilibrium assumption, where all
individuals are identical. This means, for all individuals j 2 (0; 1), CBj;t = CBt , CB;Bj;t =
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CB;Bt , C
B;A
j;t = C
B;A
t , L
T;B
j;t = L
T;B
t , L
;B
j;t = L
;B
t . All individual and aggregate behaviors
are consistent, and by implication of the identical human capital investment decisions, all
individual-specic human capital equal the economy-wide average level of human capital,
that is, H;Bj;t = H
;B
t , H
T;B
j;t = H
T;B
t . On aggregate, L
;B
t + L
T;B
t = 1 holds due to
symmetry.
For the ordinary tradables produced in Country B, the supply, Y T;Bt , equals the de-
mand, which consists of private consumption by households in Country B, those traded
to Country A (CA;Bt ), and those used in distributing drugs to Country A:
Y T;Bt = C
B;B
t + C
A;B
t + C
Dist
t :
Given that CDistt = tC
A;B
t , we have
Y T;Bt = C
B;B
t + (1 + t)C
A;B
t : (49)
There is free international trade between the two countries for the ordinary tradables.
Therefore, the ordinary tradable goods prices are equalised across the two countries at P Tt
in each period t. However, note that factor prices are not equalised, given the di¤erent
production structures of the two countries are di¤erent.
The international market equilibrium for guns are given by
Y G;At = G
G
t +G
F
t : (50)
3 Balanced growth equilibrium and solutions
A dynamic international trade equilibrium for the two-country model described is a se-
quence of consumption and labor supply allocations for household in Country A fCAt ; CA;At ;
CA;Bt ; L
A
t ; tg1t=0 and individuals (in symmetry) in Country B fCBt ; CB;Bt ; CB;At ; LT;Bt ; L;Bt g1t=0,
physical capital stock in Country A fKAt g1t=0, accumulated stocks in Country B fH;Bj;t ; HT;Bj;t ;
tg1t=0, productivity fQT;At ; QT;Bt g1t=0, output fY T;At ; Y T;Bt ; Y G;At g1t=0, factor returns fwT;At ; rT;At ; w;Bt ;
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wT;Bt g1t=0, prices fP Tt ; P t ; PGt g1t=0, constant government policy parameters (L; K ; G; )
such that, given initial stocks KA0 ; H
;B
0 ; H
T;B
0 ;0 > 0,
a) representative household in Country A maximizes expected utility by choosing
consumption allocations for ordinary tradables, drugs, and labor supply, subject to their
intertemporal budget constraint;
b) individuals in Country B maximize expected utility by choosing consumption allo-
cations for ordinary tradables, labor supplies to both production sectors, investment in
formal human capital, subject to their intertemporal budget constraint;
c) rms in the ordinary tradable goods sector in Country A maximize prots, choosing
labor and private capital, taking input prices, productivity, and initial stocks as given;
d) the single guns-producing rm in Country A maximizes prots by choosing the
amount of ordinary tradables to be used, taking the proprietary production technology
and prices as given;
e) representative rm in Country B maximizes prots by choosing e¤ective labor input,
taking wages and productivity as given;
f) drug syndicate in Country B maximizes expected payo¤by chooseing e¤ective labor
input and guns, taking prices, wage, and aggregate uncertainty as given;
g) the Government in Country A maintains a balanced budget; and
h) all markets clear.
A balanced growth equilibrium is a dynamic international trade equilibrium in which,
by implications of free trade, both Country A and Country B grow at a constant rate.
For a given set of parameters, this means (i) the endogenous variables (CAt ; C
A;A
t ; C
A;B
t ;
t; C
B
t ; C
B;B
t ; C
B;A
t ; K
A
t ; H
;B
j;t ; H
T;B
j;t ;t; Y
T;A
t ; Y
T;B
t ; Y
G;A
t ) all grow at a constant, endoge-
nous rate , with the levels exhibit steady-state properties. This implies that (ii)
the current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio (t = t=t), ordinary tradable-
drugs consumption ratio of Household in Country A (CAt = C
A
t =t), ordinary tradable
output-to-physical capital ratio in Country A (YTAKAt = Y
T;A
t =K
A
t ), Country As trad-
able consumption-to-physical capital ratio (CAKAt = C
A
t =K
A
t ), Country A-Governments
purchased guns-to-physical capital ratio (GGKAt = G
G
t =K
A
t ), Country As exported guns-
to-physical capital ratio (GFKAt = G
F
t =K
A
t ), ordinary tradable output of Country B-to-
physical capital in Country A ratio (YTBKAt = Y
T;B
t =K
A
t ), Country Bs ordinary tradable
output-to-formal human capital ratio (YTBHBt = Y
T;B
t =H
T;B
t ), the two countriesrelative
key factor inputsratio (HBKAt = H
T;B
t =K
A
t ), Country Bs household consumption-to-
Country As physical capital ratio (CBKAt = C
B
t =K
A
t ), and the ordinary tradable output-
to-drugs produced ratio in Country B (YTBt = Y
T;B
t =t) are all constant 8t; (iii) factor
returns, wages, and prices are constant, and by implications, (iv) the drugs-ordinary
tradable market price ratio (P t =P
T
t ) and the guns-ordinary tradable market price ratio
(PGt =P
T
t ) are also constant.
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The dynamic system characterizing the solutions is solved for and summarized in the
end of Appendix A. We rst study the solutions under the balanced growth equilibrium
(BGE), characterized by the set of simultaneous equations solved for in Appendix B,
with the relevant steady-state variables denoted in tildes. For simplicity, we set the
ordinary tradable price to be the base price, ~P T = 1. Also, given that, by denition, the
BGE means the growth rates are balanced across Country A, Country B, and drugs, we
further supplement the analysis by examining (computationally) the transition dynamics
of policies using the dynamic system presented in Appendix A, of which then the respective
growth rate of Country A, Country B, and drugs can di¤er and driven by the equations,
KAt+1=K
A
t , H
T;B
t+1 =H
T;B
t , and t+1=t [(82)-(84) in Appendix A]. Given the complexity of the
system, stability of the economy cannot be studied analytically. However, it is established
numerically (based on the parameterization discussed next) by solving for an initial BGE
that satises the properties dened earlier and verifying that following a shock, the system
converges to a new BGE in a nite number of periods.
4 Benchmark Parameterization
For an illustrative representation of the model, we calibrate the parameters of Country A
so as to match the endogenous ratios along the BGE to the rst moment of the respective
annual series for the United States (U.S.) in the 1990-2015 period. For drugs, as a self-
containing measure, we focus only on the plant-based drugs of cocaine and cannabis. For
Country B, to match the BGE characterization, the parameterization is based on the
average value of the 5 economies of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, and
Mexico. All 5 economies: (i) are well-documented in the various publications of United
Nations O¢ ce on Drugs and Crime [for instance, UNODC (2015-18)] to be major illicit
cocaine or cannabis suppliers to the U.S., (ii) have formal trade sector that signicantly
depends on the U.S.; (iii) are controversially known for drug syndicates that involve in
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illicit drugs and guns trades on the American soil. On average, the real GDP growth rate
of the 5 economies is slightly above 2:5 percent during the 1990-2015 period, therefore
allowing for the setting of balanced growth rate of  = 0:025 to match that of Country
A.
Given the annual time frequency and subsequent parameterizations, the discount fac-
tor is set at  = 0:995, which corresponds to an annual net return on physical capital of
4:5 percent. For Country A Households utility function, the labor preference parameter,
L, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for ordinary tradables, &CA, are set
according to Smets and Wouters (2007) at 2:0 and 0:667 (which corresponds to 1.5 in
their utility specication). The inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set at a fairly
standard value of 8:0 (Agénor 2016). For the parameters related to rational addiction of
drugs, from (9), it can be seen that the price elasticity of drugs consumption is approxi-
mated in the model by  &. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution of drugs, &, is
set at 0:46, which is the value estimated by Grossman (2004) and within the estimated
range of Pacula et al. (2001). Similarly, as a simple rearranging of the same equation
shows that the elasticity of period-t drug consumption with respect to past accumulated
addiction is given by (&  1). Based on the  0:27 estimate of Dave (2008) for chronic
cocaine addiction, and using & = 0:46, we set the preference parameter for accumulated
addiction,  = 0:5. For the rate of (anti-)persistency, , the empirically documented es-
timates for cigarettes addiction by studies such as Gruber and Köszegi (2001) are within
the 0:5 0:9 range. We set  = 0:5 to reect the more addictive nature of drugs consump-
tion. From (85), ~ = +, which means the steady-state current-to-accumulated drug
consumption ratio equals 0:525.
For the probability of avoiding conscation of drugs, , which can be interpreted
as a proxy for drug liberalization, we set  = 0:5 in the absence of such an existing
empirical estimate. Next, using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) statistics, the
sum of imported consumer goods, food, and automotive divided by personal consumption
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expenditures on goods, gives an average of 0:145. From (12), this means  = 1  0:145 =
0:855.
For ordinary tradable production in Country A, the elasticity value with respect to
e¤ective labor, , is set at 0:64, which is the common value used for United States in
studies such as Christiano et al. (2005). Given the assumption  = $T , this means
the strength of the Arrow-Romer externality with regards to physical capital stock is
also 0:64. For the elasticity of labor productivity with respect to drugs consumption,
we opt for a negative e¤ect for the benchmark case by setting A =  0:018.9 Next,
based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) capital stock dataset, the average nal
output-to-physical capital ratio of the United States is approximately 0:679, which is set
as the value of ~YTAKA along the balanced growth path. Likewise, applying the household
consumption share as a percentage of GDP series from the BEA to the IMF capital stock
dataset, we calculate Country As tradable consumption-to-physical capital ratio in the
BGE, ~CAKA = 0:453. From (15),using also the employment and wage data from the
BEA, AT;At =
(Y T;At =L
T;A
t )
wT;At
= 14:76 is calculated. From (18), this means AA0 = 14:59.
After that, using (19), given all the other parameterization, the productivity parameter,
QT;A0 = 0:1213 is estimated. Given these calibrations, and using the rst-order conditions
for ~rT;A and (87), we determine the physica capital depreciation rate, K , at a relatively
high rate of 0:2, so as to give an annual net (of depreciation) return on physical capital
of 4:5 percent.
For guns, we rely on the various editions of the annual statistical update on rearms
production and sales published by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Ex-
plosives, United States (ATF) for the parameterization. In the period of 1990-2015, 6:2
percent of total guns manufactured in the United States are exported, which gives us the
ratio of ~GF over ~Y G;A, and indirectly, its share against those purchased by the govern-
9The value corresponds to North Americas annual prevalence rate of drugs consumption (UNODC,
2018). This means the parameterization strategy involves implicitly assuming that the prevalence of drug
usage in the population translates to an equivalent e¤ect on the aggregate labor productivity.
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ment in Country A, ~GG. For the tax rate on guns production, G, based on the total
tax revenues collected under the National Firearms Act (occupational tax plus transfer &
making tax) and the estimated revenue of the guns and ammunition industry [see Brauer
(2013) and various reported gures by the Firearms Industry Trade Association (NSSF)],
G = 0:003 is estimated. For the production parameters, in the absence of existing esti-
mates, the time-invariant shift parameter, AG0 , is set at one. Further, a very low elasticity
of gunsproduction with respect to tradable inputs is set at { = 0:05, which given the as-
sumption ! = 1  { = 0:95, means guns production benets immensely from knowledge
spillover associated with the economywide physical capital stock a reasonable feature
consistent with anecdotal evidence.
For the Government in Country A, the labor and physical capital income tax rates are
calibrated based on the average wage income tax rate faced by a childless single person at
100% of average earnings (as estimated by the OECD) and the statutory corporate income
tax rate, yielding L = 0:174 and K = 0:350 respectively. The share of government
consumption as a percentage of the domestically produced tradables is estimated using
the BEA statistics again, which gives  = 0:340. Lastly, the fraction of realizable value
from conscated drugs is set at a very low rate of 0:1.
For the preference parameters in Country B, for consistency and due to a general lack
of country-specic macroeconomic studies for the sample economies, the same values for
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the inverse value of Frisch elasticity, and the
labor preference parameter are used, where &CB = 0:667,  B = 8:0, and B = 2:0. The
share of domestically produced ordinary tradables for households in Country B is set at
% = 0:8, which is in line with the averages of the sample economies. For the remaining
parameters, following Mocan et al. (2005), the formal/legal human capital depreciation
rate is set at 0:05, while the parameter for the e¢ ciency of formal/legal human capital
investment, HB, is set at 0:156. Together, these yield steady-state human capital in-
vestment (HB=HB) that approximates the average expenditure per student in tertiary
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education (32 percent of GDP per capita) for the ve sample economies. Given that our
stylized model does not separately model drugs farming, processing, and tra¢ cking in
distinct details, the share of labor hours allocated to drugs production, 1   # = 0:15, is
set in accordance to the usual estimates of employment/time spent in coca farming by the
Andean farmers [see Angrist and Kugler (2008), Organization of American States (2013),
and the various annual reports of UNODC].
For ordinary tradable production in Country B, the production elasticity, , is set
at 0:6, which is in line with the average estimated labor share of Guerriero (2012) for
the 5 economies. Given that 1 = 1    must hold to generate endogenous growth in
Country B, the learning externality is set at 0:4, which is in consistent with studies such
as Agénor (2016). For the shift parameter, QB0 = 9:41, its value is derived residually from
the relative human capital (or relative wage) ratio along the BGE, derived in (85) to be
~HT;B= ~H;B = ~w;B= ~w;B = ['q#(1 + ~)(+ )]=[(1  #)QB0 QT;A0 (AA0 )(+ )A#], the
value of which in turn depends on the parameterization for the drugs sector.
For the drugs sector, the initial value of the relative human capital ratio, ~HT;B= ~H;B,
is set at 0:25 to reect a relatively low formal human capital in relation to drug-specic
human capital. This, given an intial ~w;B = 1, yields ~wT;B = 4. With ~P T = 1, the steady-
state drug price, ~P , is parameterized based on the average wholesale price of cocaine
base (USD000 per kg) in 3 of the sample economies with data (Jamaica: USD 5.795,
Guatemala: USD 9.329, Honduras: USD7.3), yielding ~P  = 7:5. This then gives ~ = 6:5.
In the absence of reliable statistics, and given that it is a policy arrangement that will be
evaluated extensively in our policy experiments, we set the initial benchmark probability
of successfully producing drugs at q = 0:5. Given the values of ~w;B, ~, q, and ~L;B,
using (43), we can estimate the elasticity of drugs production with respect to drug-specic
e¤ective labor, ', to be 0:076. Lastly, given a value of  = 0:05, the shift parameter for
distribution cost, 0, equals 6:294.
The remaining variables are calibrated as follows. With all the parameters determined,
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we can calculate the steady-state value of ordinary tradable consumption in Country B
and A using (91) and (101) respectively, yielding unadjusted values of ~CB = 0:516 and
~CA = 1:296. Given that ~CAKA = 0:453, we can then determine the unadjusted bench-
mark value for ~KA.10 For the steady-state price of guns, ~PG, we rst estimate a price
ratio of ~P = ~PG. While precise sales estimates for both drugs and guns are impossible
to pin down, we can derive a price ratio based on the respective quantity of production,
as well as the estimated total industry values (NSSF and ATF for guns, UNOCD for
drugs). We estimated ~P = ~PG = 1:82, which gives ~PG = 4:12. From (44), we also calcu-
late ~PG ~GF = 1:878, which then gives ~GF = 0:456. Country As exported guns-to-physical
capital ratio along the BGE is then estimated to be ~GFKA = 0:159. To ensure the parame-
terization is realistic, using (108) from Appendix B, and both ~CAKA and ~GFKA , we get a
guns-to-consumption ratio in Country A of 0:35, a value that approximates the proportion
of American households with rearms (Smith and Son 2015). From (107) in Appendix B,
~CAKA =
n
AR0 
 &CA(+ )
&CA
&
 '
(1  #)'(1 + ~)&CA '( ~PG)' [q(1  ')] '
o
~GFKA , which
then allows us to derive the last parameter value, AR0 = 1:291. In sum, all the parameter
values are summarized in Table 1 and 2.
5 Illustrative Policy Experiments
In the policy debate on modern drug control (LSE, 2014), a key controversy often sur-
rounds the question of whether it is most e¤ective for intervention to be in the nal
consumer stage (also, prohibition vs. legalization), the initial production stage (interdic-
tion policy at source country), or in the intermediate tra¢ cking/transhipment stage. In
10As shown in Appendix B, in order for the existence of non-cornered solution for ~CB > 0, the
parameterization must satisfy the analytical conditions,  1(1 + )&
 1
CB   (1  HB) > 0, which is indeed
the case for our benchmark. In addition, it is also common practice, when implementing numerical policy
experiments for transition dynamic analysis in the later section, to normalize the initial values of ~KA,
~CB , and ~CA from the unadjusted value to an index of one. These have no e¤ect on the computations of
the gross growth rates of the aforementioned variables.
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addition, there are also concerns about the impact of the illicit gun trade on drugs trades
(and related conicts). Given the rigorous (albeit stylized) analytical foundations of our
model, we set out to answer some of these questions by implementing numerical policy
experiments using the parameterized model. We consider four individual policies: (i) an
increase in the probability of not having drugs conscated by the government in Country
A,  (a proxy for relaxed legislation); (ii) a decrease in the probability of successfully
producing drugs by the drug syndicate in Country B, q (more prohibitive supply-side pol-
icy); (iii) an increase in the shift parameter for drug distribution, 0, so as to make drug
transhipment more costly; and (iv) an increase in the tax rate for guns production, G.11
For consistency of comparison, all simulated policy experiments involve a permanent one
percent shock from the initial parameter values set for the respective parameters.
5.1 Is legalization or prohibition the better approach?
To examine this question, we simulate a permanent one percent increase in the probability
of not having drug conscated by the government in Country A, . This can be interpreted
as a growing relaxation of drug control policy at the nal consumer market, hence a proxy
for potential legalization of drug possession. The steady-state e¤ects are summarized
in Table 3, with the transition dynamics of selected variables illustrated in Figure 1.
In the benchmark case, both current-period drug consumption/production (~) and its
size relative to accumulated stock of addiction (~) increase by 0:44 and 0:52 percent
respectively in the steady state. For Country A, this translates to the growth rate of
physical capital stock, and by implication the growth rate of tradable output over the
11It is worth pointing out that, to save space, a policy experiment with regards to human capital
investment e¢ ciency in Country B, HB , is not presented. As would be seen, all 4 drug-control related
polices considered have only level and not growth e¤ect on Country Bs ordinary tradable production in
the steady state. A permanent increase in HB is the obvious policy to raise the growth rate of tradables
in Country B (for instance, doubling HB will raise steady-state growth rate of Y T;B by 1:1 percent).
However, the policy largely has no steady-state e¤ect on the growth rates of key variables in Country A,
as well as the drugs and guns trades, therefore not being explicitly discussed.
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long run (given the constancy of ~YTAKA), declining by 1:0 percent. However, given the
constancy of private household consumption allocation between ordinary tradables and
drugs in Country A in the long run (~CA), growth rate of private consumption increases
at 0:44 percent too. For Country B, by implication of the productivity specication in
(38), the growth rate of tradable output in Country B is largely una¤ected in the long
run (as it depends on the ratio ~YTAKA). However, as seen in Figure 1, there is a negative
impact e¤ect on ordinary tradable production in Country B. This is due to the increase
in drug consumption relative to accumulated addiction, which means the accumulated
drug-specic human capital stock is increasing over time along the transition path. At
the optimality condition for individuals in Country B ( ~HT;B ~wT;B = ~H;B ~w;B), at a given
relative wage ratio, the rise in the level of ~H;B also means a decline in the level of
formal/legal human capital stock ~HT;B, resulting in a decline of the growth rate of relative
human capital stock in Country B. Formal tradable production in Country B therefore
declines in level, despite the policy being growth-neutral for Country B in the long-run.
Consequently, this translates to lower private consumption of tradables in Country B,
which in turn has a negative e¤ect on the ordinary tradable production in Country A.
The decline in the growth rate of both ~Y T;A and ~KA leads to a decline in the growth rate
of guns production, given that its production uses the former as input while benets from
the spillover e¤ect of the latter.
While not explicitly presented, it is worth noting that the simulation results with
respect to a change in  are largely monotonic, in that, an opposite experiment of a
tougher drug legislation (decline in ) delivers the opposite e¤ects (albeit at slightly
di¤erent magnitude) for all the key variables. In addition, as seen in the sensitivity results
presented, the policy e¤ects are mostly robust to key parameter changes, including both
positive and negative elasticities with regards to labor productivity in Country A. In other
words, irresspective of whether drug consumption improves or reduces labor productivity
in Country A, the policy e¤ects associated with a change in  are consistent. However,
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interestingly, as would also be seen in all the other experiments, a smaller initial value
of the intertemporal elasticity substitution for drugs consumption, &, would result in
increased cyclicality in the model behaviors. While the long-run steady-state e¤ects, in
terms of signs/policy directions, are still consistent with the benchmark case (albeit at
stronger magnitudes), the cyclicality means any drug policy targeted at the nal consumer
stage will have less predictable transition path the lower the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is.
Is legalization or prohibition the better approach?Based on the analysis, stricter
drug control policy is growth-enhancing in the long run and promotes formal/legal hu-
man capital accumulation in the source country, though households in Country A will
experience a decline in consumption growth. If the maximization of private consumption
growth (often a welfare indicator) is is the leading objective over production growth-
maximization, then there is a rationale for Country A to relax its drug-control rule at the
cost of some deceleration in tradable output growth.
5.2 Does more interdiction & prohibitive supply-side policy work?
Next, we consider policy targeting directly the supply-side, which includes measures that
attempt to eradicate drug cultivation. Such policies can be proxied by a permanent
decrease in the probability of successfully producing drug in Country B. We simulate a
one-percent decrease in q from the initial probability, with results on the steady-state
e¤ects and transitional dynamics presented in Table 3 and Figure 2 respectively. This has
a direct negative impact on drugs production, resulting in an immediate impact of  0:80
percent on growth of current-period drug production, and eventually a stable steady-state
e¤ect of  0:67 percent. As a share of accumulated stock of addiction, the ratio declines by
0:78 percent. This translates to a decline in the stock of drug-specic human capital, which
for a given relative wage ratio, means an increase in the level of formal/legal human capital
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stock in Country B. This in turn leads to a higher level of ordinary tradable production
in Country B. While the steady-state e¤ect on growth rate remains muted given the (38)
specication, the expansion in production level means there is a short-term positive e¤ects
on the growth rate of tradable production in Country B along the transition path, as seen
in all-but-one cases in Figure 2 (except when A = 0:072, in which drug consumption has
a positive stimulant e¤ect on labor productivity in Country A).
In the steady state, the decline in drugs production, at a given demand and consump-
tion allocation of household in Country A, leads to a decline in overall growth rate of
private consumption in Country A. However, the steady-state gains in the level of or-
dinary tradables and the growth of relative human capital stock in Country B lead to
higher level of trades between the 2 countries, resulting in a long-run increase in tradable
production in Country A by 4:8 percent. At a given tradable output-to-physical capi-
tal ratio, this means growth rate of physical capital stock also rises by 4:8 percent. By
implication, steady-state growth rate of private consumption in Country B increases by
the same magnitude. Lastly, the steady-state increase in the price of drugs (due to the
decline in supply) means, at a given equilibrium drug-gun price ratio, the price of guns
declines (by 2:9 percent), resulting in a steady-state increase of total guns production.
In terms of the sensitivity analysis results, the long-run policy e¤ects appear to be
robust across most parameters, though increased cyclicality along the transition path
is observed again when & = 0:3. In addition, when the demand of tradable inputs in
guns production is a lot more elastic ( = 0:5), the steady-state expansionary growth
e¤ects observed for tradable production and physical capital in Country A, and private
consumption in Country B are reversed. In this instance, the contractionary e¤ect in
guns production (associated with the decline in drug supplies) weights more heavily on
tradable production in Country A, and this negativity dominates the international trade-
expansionary e¤ect associated with higher level of tradable production in Country B.
In summary, our simulation results show that more prohibitive supply-side intervention
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appears to be e¤ective in reducing world drug supplies while promoting growth in ordinary
tradable good trades. More signicantly, there is again a production-consumption growth
trade-o¤ observed in Country A for all but one of the cases examined.
5.3 Is an elevated mark-up in drug price universally good?
It is often perceived that growing interdiction of transhipments in the recent decades had
successfully elevated drug prices to a very high level at the nal wholesale and retail levels,
which in turn signicantly reduced global drug consumption. Is this a universally good
policy? We address this question by simulating a permanent one-percent increase in the
distribution cost parameter, 0. The steady-state e¤ects are summarized in Table 4, and
the transition dynamics of key variables illustrated in Figure 3. Predictably, the steady-
state drug price increases by 6:7 percent, and this leads to declines in both steady-state
supply and demand. Nevertheless, given that the benchmark parameterization is one
that portrays relative inelastic drug supply and demand, current-period drug production
declines by only 0:16 percent in the long run. In terms of its consumption relative to
accumulated stock of addiction, the ratio is about 0:2 percent lower in the new steady
state. At a given consumption allocation, household in Country A experiences a decline
in private consumption growth.
For Country B, the decline in accumulated stock of drug-specic human capital means,
at a given relative wage ratio, the level of formal/legal human capital stock increases,
leading to a permanent increase in the growth rate of relative human capital stock. This
in turn leads to an expansion in the level of ordinary tradable production in Country B.
Nevertheless, given the positive level, but not growth, e¤ect on formal human capital, the
positive e¤ect on tradable production growth in Country B is only along the transition
path. At the same time, the decline in drugs production also leads to a steady-state
drop in the demand of the input of guns, the production of which uses ordinary tradables
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in Country A. Unlike the two previously considered experiments, for this specic policy,
the combination of this and the decline in private consumption growth in Country A
dominates the initial international trade-expansion e¤ect even in the benchmark case,
causing the growth rate of ordinary tradable production in Country A to decline by 1:6
percent in the steady state. Physical capital stock declines by the same magnitude in the
resulting steady state, and the declining tradable production growth in Country A leads
to lower private consumption growth in Country B in the steady state. Lastly, the drop in
gun supplies leads to the price of guns to increase, eventually restoring the drug-gun price
ratio to a new equilibrium level. In short, the results show that, drug-control intervention
at the transhipment stage does have signicant e¤ect in the short-to-medium term in
reducing drugs trade, though at the expense of some lost in consumption growth. The
long-run steady-state e¤ect is also small.
In terms of sensitivity analysis, notwithstanding the two established observations with
transitional dynamics (lower &: increased cyclicality; positive A: negative transitional
e¤ect of growth in tradable production in Country B), the results are largely consistent
again with a single exception ( = 0:5). In this specic instance, the steady-state ef-
fects associated with tradable production and physical capital in Country A, and private
consumption in Country B are reversed again. This suggests potential signicance of the
guns production structure in this model, and the structural signicance of this parameter
is examined in greater details later.
5.4 The controversial drug-gun trade nexus
A permanent one-percent increase in the tax rate on guns production, G is simulated.
The steady-state and transitional dynamic e¤ects of selected variables are presented in
Table 4 and Figure 4 respectively. Recall that our stylized model essentially treats all
illicit component of world gun trades as the exported share, while the purchase made by
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the government in Country A can be interpreted as all other legal purchases. As such,
while this experiment does not shed light on the heated domestic gun-control debate that
has been taking place in the United States recently, it does refer to a taxation/fee that is
levied on the production of all guns.
In Table 4, it is seen that the tax rate is growth-neutral on drugs production in the
long run, despite guns being modelled as a factor of production for drugs. Given this, the
long-run e¤ect on current-to-accumulated drug consumption ratio is also muted, therefore
leading to growth neutrality in the relative human capital stock in Country B too. At
a given ordinary tradable-drugs consumption ratio, the long-run growth neutrality of ~
means the growth e¤ect of private consumption of tradables in Country A is also muted.
Nevertheless, along the transition path, it is clearly seen in Figure 4 that there are short-
run e¤ects along the transition path, with the model taking a much longer time to transit
to the new steady state compared to the 3 experiments previously considered.12 The
higher tax levied at production leads to an instantaneous decline in the supply of guns.
At the initial factor-price ratio for guns production, this negative supply shock leads to
a decrease in drugs production on impact and by implication, the growth rate of drug-
specic human capital. At a given initial level of relative stock of human capital, this
translates to an increase in the growth rate of relative human capital stock in Country
B along the transition. However, the decline in current-period drug production means
drug price increases on impact, leading to a decline in drug consumption. At an initial
optimal consumption allocation, household in Country A consumes less on impact, leading
to a decline in the growth rate of ordinary tradable production in Country B on impact.
Nevertheless, given that the optimality condition for drugs production remains unchanged,
the actual world price of guns remains unchanged. From the optimality condition in (24),
12Indeed, for the sensitivity analysis with regards to lower &, the growing cyclicality is such that,
the system runs into convergence issue for parameterization with & < 0:43. We present the case where
& = 0:44 in Figure 4, which shows that the variables still do not converge to the new steady state after
T = 200.
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the guns manufacturer eventually makes up for this production levy by producing more
guns (+0:5 percent at the steady state) and in the process, demands more tradable inputs.
This translates to a steady-state increase of the same magnitude for the growth of tradable
production and physical capital stock in Country B, and consequently via international
trade, the growth of private consumption in Country B. As all the other production
dynamics in Country B are una¤ected by this policy in the long-run, growth neutrality is
eventually observed for the growth rates of tradables, relative human capital stock, and
drugs production in Country B as the economy coverges to the new steady state.
The experiment considered essentially shows that, any non-quota gun-control policy,
such as a tax levied on production, will have no long-term implication on illicit guns
trade, if there is no fundamental change to its demand and supply. This, together with
the limited long-run growth e¤ect observed with transhipment intervention, is consistent
with the logic of the drug-producer compensates with increased higher productivityef-
fect documented in Ortiz (2003, 2009), hence partly explains the limited e¤ect of drug
tra¢ cking-control measures in the region (see, for instance, Reuter and Trautmann 2009).
5.5 Further sensitivity analysis
Based on the results of the individual policies considered, the long-run growth e¤ects of
the two major drug control policies are further evaluated in the context of varying trade
openness in Table 5 and 6.
Specically, in Table 5, the rst policy experiment with regards to  is repeatedly
simulated with di¤erent parameterization of the share of domestically produced tradables
in the aggregate consumption of household in Country A, . In addition, given the
well-documented signicance of the (anti-)persistency rate, , in the rational addiction
literature, we also evaluate the policy outcome across  2 (0:1; 0:9). The initial value
of  is structurally signicant in that, for any given value of , there is a range of value
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for  where the steady-state growth e¤ect of production in Country A is negative, when
drug law is liberalized. Indeed, the more open Country A is (proxied by a larger share
of imported goods in households aggregate consumption of tradables, smaller ), the
narrower the range of  with negative growth e¤ect, hence providing greater possibility for
drug liberalization policy to be growth-enhancing. Overall, despite a completely di¤erent
framework, our ndings are mainly consistent with Becker et al. (2006), in that, the more
addictive drug is, the greater the increase in the social cost from using greater enforcement;
the less past addiction inuences current consumption, there is greater room for potential
benets in pursuing drug liberalization.
In Table 6, we assess the policy that is more relevant to Country B, which is the
experiment of a permanent decrease in the probability of successfully producing drug, q,
across a range of Country Bconsumption share of domestically produced tradables (%).
Moreover, given the observed structural signicance of the gunsproduction elasticity,
, in the benchmark case, we also evaluate the policy e¤ectiveness (in terms of private
consumption growth in Country B) across di¤erent  values. Unlike the previous case,
a clear structual break-point for  is observed for di¤erent % values, below which the
growth e¤ect on consumption in Country B is positive. It appears that, the more closed
Country B is (in terms of its individualsconsumption share), the lower the structural
break-point for  is. Given that the Arrow-Romer externality e¤ect in guns production
sector is given by ! = 1  {, this provides a natural policy interpretation. In essence, if
Country B is more closed(higher % value), in order for prohibitive supply-side policy to
be growth-enhancing to household consumption in Country B, the learning externality or
degree of knowledge spillover in the guns-production industry would need to be higher.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Against the backdrop of a persistent, well-documented, yet controversial illicit drugs and
rearms trade in the Central American and Caribbean region, this paper contributes to
the literature by developing a two-country, multi-sectorial dynamic general equilibrium
model of endogenous growth with drugs and guns trade. To date, the literature on
macroeconomics of drugs have focused mainly in modelling the vertical supply-chain of
drugs and the resulting conicts from drug tra¢ cking. We adopt a relatively horizontal
perspective to model the world illicit trades, by developing a unied growth framework
with international trade that also accounts for drugsrational addiction in the demand
side. This allows us to ll the 3 major gaps in existing analytical literature, namely: (i)
examine the dynamic tradeo¤ and long-run growth implications of drug-control policies
in both consuming and producing countries; (ii) explicitly model the rearm market
albeit in a stylized manner and explore its link to the illicit drugs trade; (iii) analyze
the spillover e¤ects between illicit trades and formal international trades. The numerical
policy experiments (using parameterized version of the model) help uncover a output
growth-consumption tradeo¤ that is previously not documented in the literature, while
providing some insights to a number of drug-control policy questions that are real and
concrete (previewed in the Introduction and will not be repeated here).
Despite the contributions, there remain shortcomings that future studies can address.
While we believe the model provides a better world-view to the illicit trades, some
features of vertically-integrated models, such as Mejía and Restrepo (2016), have to be
dropped as self-contained measures to enable the existence of both analytical solutions of
a BGE and numerical solutions for the large-scale dynamic system. Our model therefore
is unable to account for phenomenon such as the balloon e¤ect (the ability of drug
production to move to a new location or across international borders), and any resulting
spike in violence and conicts associated with drug trades. In addition, the modelling of
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drug-consumers, while accounted for rational addiction, has also omitted the possibility
of asymmetric information and costly search, such as in Galenianos et al (2012). The
same can be said for the illicit guns trade, which is modelled in a very simplistic manner.
For future research, any attempt to expand the universeof the model will necessarily
involve accounting for these features. In addition, with greater availability of data, given
the notorious volatility in drug supply and prices, the introduction of more stochastic
elements into a dynamic model to capture more realistic short-term movements in drug
prices is also warranted.
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Table 1
Benchmark Parameter Values, Country A
Parameter Description Value
Country A - Households
Λ Subjective discount factor 0.995
ηL Preference parameter, disutility of labor 2.0
 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 8.0
&CA Elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ordinary goods 0.667
π Probability of avoiding confiscation, drugs possession 0.5
ηΞ Preference parameter, rational addiction 0.5
φ Rate of (anti-)persistence, accumulated drugs consumed 0.5
θ Share of domestically produced ordinary tradables 0.855
&Ξ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution, drugs 0.46
δK Physical capital depreciation 0.20
Country A - Production
β Elasticity of ordinary tradables wrt e§ective labor 0.64
QT,A0 Productivity parameter, ordinary tradables 0.1213
$T Strength of Arrow-Romer externality, physical capital stock 0.64
υA Elasticity of labor productivity wrt drugs consumption −0.018
AA0 Productivity parameter, base labor productivity level 14.59
{ Elasticity of guns’ production wrt tradable inputs 0.05
! Production externality from economywide physical capital stock 0.95
AG0 Time-invariant productivity parameter for guns’ production 1.0
Country A - Government
ν Share of gov. consumption in domestically produced tradables 0.340
τL Labor income tax rate 0.174
τK Physical capital income tax rate 0.350
τG Taxation on guns’ sales 0.003
z Fraction of realizable value from confiscated drugs 0.100
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Table 2
Benchmark Parameter Values, Country B
Parameter Description Value
Country B - Individuals
&CB Elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ordinary goods 0.667
 B Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 8.0
ηB Preference parameter, disutility of labor 2.0
ΘHB Parameter, e¢ciency of human capital investment 0.156
δHB Formal/legal human capital depreciation rate 0.05
% Share of domestically produced ordinary tradables 0.8
# Share of labor hours allocated to ord. tradable production 0.85
Country B - Production
α Elasticity of ordinary tradables wrt e§ective labor 0.6
QB0 Productivity parameter, ordinary tradables 9.41
φ1 Strength of Arrow-Romer externality, formal human capital 0.4
Country B - Drug syndicate & distribution
AR0 Productivity parameter, drugs production 1.291
' Elasticity of drugs production wrt drug-specific e§ective labor 0.076
q Probability of successfully producing drugs 0.5
κ0 Distribution cost parameter, drugs trade 6.294
ρ Elasticity of distr. cost wrt current-to-accumulated world drugs trades 0.05
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An increase in the probability of not having drug confiscated by the government in Country A ( π)
Initial Values Benchmark νA = ‐0.072 νA = 0.072 ςΞ = 0.3 χ = 0.5 ρ = 0.5 β = 0.3
Growth of tradable output in Country A  0.025 ‐0.0099 ‐0.0105 ‐0.0090 ‐0.0488 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0099
Growth of private consumption, Country A  0.025 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0034 0.0044 0.0053 0.0044
Growth of physical capital stock, Country A  0.025 ‐0.0099 ‐0.0105 ‐0.0090 ‐0.0488 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0099
Growth of tradable output in Country B 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of private consumption, Country B 0.025 ‐0.0099 ‐0.0105 ‐0.0090 ‐0.0488 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0099
Growth of relative human capital stock, Country B  0.000 ‐0.0052 ‐0.0052 ‐0.0052 ‐0.0079 ‐0.0052 ‐0.0062 ‐0.0052
Growth of current‐period drug production 0.025 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0034 0.0044 0.0053 0.0044
Current‐to‐accumulated drug consumption ratio 0.525 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 0.0079 0.0052 0.0062 0.0052
Price of drugs 7.500 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0049 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0379 ‐0.0032
Growth of total guns production 0.025 ‐0.0099 ‐0.0105 ‐0.0090 ‐0.0488 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0099
Price of guns 4.120 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0211 ‐0.0043
A decrease in the probability of successfully producing drug in Country B (q)
Initial Values Benchmark νA = ‐0.072 νA = 0.072 ςΞ = 0.3 χ = 0.5 ρ = 0.5 β = 0.3
Growth of tradable output in Country A  0.025 0.0479 0.0488 0.0466 0.1114 ‐0.0246 0.0357 0.0498
Growth of private consumption, Country A  0.025 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0065 ‐0.0051 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0079 ‐0.0066
Growth of physical capital stock, Country A  0.025 0.0479 0.0488 0.0466 0.1115 ‐0.0246 0.0357 0.0498
Growth of tradable output in Country B 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of private consumption, Country B 0.025 0.0479 0.0488 0.0466 0.1114 ‐0.0246 0.0357 0.0498
Growth of relative human capital stock, Country B  0.000 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0118 0.0077 0.0092 0.0077
Growth of current‐period drug production 0.025 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0065 ‐0.0051 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0079 ‐0.0066
Current‐to‐accumulated drug consumption ratio 0.525 ‐0.0077 ‐0.0077 ‐0.0077 ‐0.0118 ‐0.0077 ‐0.0092 ‐0.0077
Price of drugs 7.500 0.0048 0.0048 0.0048 0.0074 0.0048 0.0579 0.0048
Growth of total guns production 0.025 0.0479 0.0488 0.0466 0.1114 ‐0.0246 0.0357 0.0498
Price of guns 4.120 ‐0.0287 ‐0.0287 ‐0.0287 ‐0.0252 ‐0.0287 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0287
Note: All simulated policies represent a one percent shock from the initial value of the relevant policy arrangement.
Source: Authors' calculations.
An increase in the price mark‐up shift parameter for drug distribution ( κ0)
Initial Values Benchmark νA = ‐0.072 νA = 0.072 ςΞ = 0.3 χ = 0.5 ρ = 0.5 β = 0.3
Growth of tradable output in Country A  0.025 ‐0.0157 ‐0.0155 ‐0.0160 ‐0.0176 0.0228 ‐0.0187 ‐0.0174
Growth of private consumption, Country A  0.025 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0016
Growth of physical capital stock, Country A  0.025 ‐0.0157 ‐0.0155 ‐0.0160 ‐0.0176 0.0228 ‐0.0187 ‐0.0174
Growth of tradable output in Country B 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of private consumption, Country B 0.025 ‐0.0157 ‐0.0155 ‐0.0160 ‐0.0176 0.0228 ‐0.0187 ‐0.0174
Growth of relative human capital stock, Country B  0.000 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0016 0.0019 0.0023 0.0019
Growth of current‐period drug production 0.025 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0016
Current‐to‐accumulated drug consumption ratio 0.525 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0019
Price of drugs 7.500 0.0662 0.0662 0.0662 0.0660 0.0662 0.0792 0.0662
Growth of total guns production 0.025 ‐0.0157 ‐0.0155 ‐0.0160 ‐0.0176 0.0228 ‐0.0187 ‐0.0174
Price of guns 4.120 0.0321 0.0321 0.0321 0.0319 0.0321 0.0384 0.0321
An increase in the tax rate on guns sales (τG)
Initial Values Benchmark νA = ‐0.072 νA = 0.072 ςΞ = 0.44* χ = 0.5 ρ = 0.5 α = 0.3
Growth of tradable output in Country A  0.025 0.0048 0.0047 0.0047 0.0045 0.0001 0.0047 0.0068
Growth of private consumption, Country A  0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of physical capital stock, Country A  0.025 0.0048 0.0047 0.0047 0.0046 0.0001 0.0047 0.0068
Growth of tradable output in Country B 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of private consumption, Country B 0.025 0.0048 0.0047 0.0047 0.0045 0.0001 0.0047 0.0068
Growth of relative human capital stock, Country B  0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of current‐period drug production 0.025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Current‐to‐accumulated drug consumption ratio 0.525 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Price of drugs 7.500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth of total guns production 0.025 0.0048 0.0047 0.0047 0.0045 0.0001 0.0047 0.0068
Price of guns 4.120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: All simulated policies represent a one percent shock from the initial value of the relevant policy arrangement.
 * Numerical solutions for the system do not exist as the system runs into convergence issue for parameterization with ςΞ < 0.43.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 4
Results Summary for Policy Experiments: Steady‐state effects (continue)
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Table 3
Results Summary for Policy Experiments: Steady‐state effects
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Country A's consumption share of 
domestically produced (θ)
0.555 0.655 0.755
0.855 
(Benchmark)
0.955
Rate of (anti‐)persistence φ
0.1 0.0080 0.0080 0.0080 0.0078 0.0075
0.2 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0985 0.0534 0.0292 0.0246
0.3 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0062 ‐0.0132 ‐0.0241 ‐0.0290
0.4 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0036 ‐0.0076 ‐0.0123 ‐0.0135
0.5 (Benchmark) ‐0.0004 ‐0.0028 ‐0.0062 ‐0.0099 ‐0.0107
0.6 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0024 ‐0.0056 ‐0.0090 ‐0.0097
0.7 0.0000 ‐0.0022 ‐0.0054 ‐0.0086 ‐0.0093
0.8 0.0001 ‐0.0021 ‐0.0052 ‐0.0084 ‐0.0091
0.9 0.0001 ‐0.0021 ‐0.0051 ‐0.0083 ‐0.0091
Country B' consumption share of 
domestically produced (ϱ)
0.5 0.6 0.7
0.8 
(Benchmark)
0.9
Elasticity of guns' production wrt 
tradable inputs χ
0.05 (Benchmark) 0.0286 0.0359 0.0423 0.0479 0.0530
0.10 0.0370 0.0480 0.0582 0.0679 0.0771
0.15 0.0605 0.0851 0.1128 0.1445 0.1809
0.20 0.1646 0.3849 0.6714 ‐0.1300 ‐0.4922
0.25 ‐0.2525 ‐0.1586 ‐0.1287 ‐0.1141 ‐0.1054
0.30 ‐0.0744 ‐0.0674 ‐0.0636 ‐0.0612 ‐0.0596
0.35 ‐0.0451 ‐0.0438 ‐0.0430 ‐0.0425 ‐0.0421
0.40 ‐0.0333 ‐0.0332 ‐0.0331 ‐0.0331 ‐0.0330
0.45 ‐0.0274 ‐0.0275 ‐0.0276 ‐0.0277 ‐0.0278
0.225 0.214 0.200 0.193 0.186
Indicative structural break‐point for ω: 0.775 0.786 0.800 0.807 0.814
Drug Legalisation in Consumer Market ‐ Long‐run Growth effects in Country A:                  
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
An increase in the probability of not having drug confiscated by the government in Country A by one percent from initial 
probability value (π)
Table 5
A decrease in the probability of successfully producing drug in Country B by one percent from initial probability value (q)
Structural break‐point for χ, for a given 
consumption share of domestically‐
produced in Country B:
    Different value of φ and  θ
                Different value of χ and  ϱ
Table 6
More Prohibitive Supply‐side Policy ‐ Growth effects on Private Consumption in Country B:       
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 1
Permanent increase in probability of not having drugs confiscated in Country A
A one percent increase in      from initial value
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Permanent decrease in the probability of successfully producing drug in Country B
A one percent decrease in q from initial value
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 3
Permanent increase in the price mark-up shift parameter for drug distribution
A one percent increase in         from initial value
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 4
Permanent increase in the tax rate on guns sales
A one percent in        from initial value
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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